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Abstract 
Both Barrett (1991) and Hoel (1991) show that uniform solutions cannot guar-
antee that the  IR constraint is satisfied. This drawback of uniform solutions 
dramatically reduces feasibility of uniform solutions. However, when uniform 
reductions are property specified, this conclusion is no longer valid. Compared 
to Barrett (1991), which proposes a uniform absolute reduction, this paper pro-
poses uniform solutions that are defined as equal percentage reduction com-
pared to some pre-agreement reduction level, in accordance with real world 
specification. For such a specification, uniform solutions that satisfy IR will al-
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1.  Introduction 
This paper corrects one misunderstanding about uniform reductions obligations 
applied to international environmental problems ( IEP) that have given these 
types of solutions a bad reputation. This is done by showing that, when properly 
specified, uniform solutions always exists that guarantees that the individual 
rationality ( IR) constraint is satisfied without the use of side payments for a 
general class of international environmental problems. This result is in contrast 
to common wisdom, built on papers of Barrett (1991) and Hoel (1991), where it 
is shows that uniform solutions merely accidentally satisfies IR when side pay-
ments are not reliable. This new insight might explain why uniform solutions 
remain one of the main default approaches to address international environ-
mental problems. 
 
Caused by the lack of supranational authority empowered to enforce unpopular 
solution upon sovereign countries, the IR-constraint is a very important condi-
tion. Basically, individual rationality is a prerequisite for solutions to be part of 
any politically feasible set. On the other hand, there is a common understanding 
that side payments are not reliable.
1 The combination of these two conditions 
leads to certain limitations on the set of feasible solutions, but this paper shows 
that uniform solutions always are part of this set. 
 
We state two main results. The first is that when reductions are specified rela-
tive to the non co-operative outcome, there always exists a uniform reduction 
that satisfies IR without the use of side-payments. The analysis builds mainly 
on the reaction function approach, as e.g. specified in Hoel (1992). The implica-
tions are that no matter the ex ante information structure, or whether or not 
cost-curves are common knowledge or private information, the uniform solu-
tions are always reliable. Moreover, it is shown that it is always possible to 
specify what uniform solution is feasible. The second result is that there always 
exists an optimal uniform solution that satisfies the  IR-constraint without the 
                                                                 
1  Mäler (1993, p.27) mentions that ‘it is somewhat surprising that instances where international 
environmental problems have been solved with the aid of side-payments are very rare’.  
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use of side payments, which again is in contrast to the results in Barrett (1991) 
and Hoel (1991). 
 
Once established that a uniform solution always exists, three different uniform 
solutions are considered, all yielding a Pareto-improvement over the non co-
operative solution, without relying on side payments. The first is the optimal 
uniform solution, which picks that uniform reduction that maximises the overall 
welfare, subject to the individual rationality constraint. This solution represents 
the upper limit on welfare under the uniformity constraint. The second is the 
least common denominator approach, which has been thoroughly analysed in 
Brandt (2001) and Eyckmans (1998). This specific solution deserves as a lower 
bound on the welfare, uniform solutions can guarantee. This result basically 
comes around because no matter the state of information, this solution will al-
ways represent a situation where no participants have any incentive to misrep-
resent their preferences. In between these upper and lower bounds, other di-
mensions, like fairness measures, or constraints, could also be applied: This will 
be the third solution that is considered for a two-country situation. Hence, uni-
form solutions can be tailored at lest somewhat towards optimality, fairness and 
truth telling, always satisfying individual rationality, of course const rained by 
the uniformity constraint. 
 
In the light of the above results, it will no longer come as a surprise that uni-
form solutions have been focal to many negotiations, especially when taking 
into account their simplicity.
2 However, one should not exaggerate the merits of 
uniform solutions, since the major drawback of uniform solutions is there the 
lack of flexibility. If costs of one country increase, then all countries will have 
to reduce less under all three uniform solutions specified in this paper. This 
                                                                 
2  According to Greene (1996) simple expressed commitments involving uniform reduction obli-
gations are usually more negotiable. Falkinger, Hackl and Pruckner (1996) claim that a mecha-
nism must be so simple that a layman understands it Eyckmans (1998) argues that a main rea-
son why uniform solutions are politically feasible is that they are easy to implement. Young 
(1989) identifies the presence of focal points as one of the main conditions that increases the 
likelihood of success. Paterson (1996) and Grubb (1996) even argue that differentiation in prac-
tice would operate to reduce the overall effectiveness of future climate agreements.  
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yields the obvious consequence that uniform solutions are most effective when 
countries are relatively alike.
3 
 
Uniform obligations demand an equal percentage reduction of all participating 
countries. Among the more essential agreements can  be mentioned: The 1979 
convention on long-range transboundary air pollution, which was signed by 32 
European countries (and the EEC), the USA and Canada. In 1985 a protocol 
was added to the convention committing the 21 signatories to reduce sulphur 
emissions by at least 30% by 1993 as compared to the 1980 emission level (the 
"30% club"). In 1991 the "protocol on the control of emissions of VOC" (vola-
tile organic compounds) concerned a 30 per cent reduction of the 1988 level of 
VOC by 1999. The 1989 "protocol on the control of nitrogen oxides" which 
constitutes a basic obligation to freeze the NOx -emission at the 1987 level be-
fore 1995. The 1987 Montreal Protocol calls for 50% reductions in CFC emis-
sions by the signatories by 1999 compared to 1987 (with a 10-year lag for de-
veloping countries).
4 Several agreements that entail differentiated obligations 
also exist, e.g. the 1976 Bonn Convention for the protection of the Rhine 
Against Pollution by Chlorides, where the Netherlands, Germany, France and 
Switzerland agreed to share reduction costs in proportions 34:30:30:6. Last, but 
not least, the Kyoto-protocol stipulates differentiated reduction in 2008-2012 
compared to 1990 for most OECD countries. The last two differentiated reduc-
tion regimes are mentioned to point to how general the uses of baseline emis-
sions from which these reduction requirements are calculated are the countries’ 
individual emission levels immediately before the agreement becomes effec-
tive. Hence, this way of specifying reduction obligations is very common for 
international environmental treaties. 
 
To show our point in comparison with the result of Barrett (1991), section 2 
states the two different approaches, while in section 3, the point of departure is 
the original functional form presented in Barrett (1991). Section 4 generalizes 
                                                                 
3  Tietenberg (1985) reports that for 17 different types of pollutants a uniform percentage emis-
sion reduction results in 7-95 percent higher costs to reach a specific environmental target 
compared to the cost minimizing way. 
4  Greene (1996) notes more that 20 different operational solutions that can be labeled uniform, 
which all have different merits, and hence uniform approaches surely deserve more attention.  
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the results building on the reaction function approach of Hoel (1992) and the 
main results are stated and discussed. Next, important comparative static results 
are derived in section 5, and these results are used in section 6 to derive upper 
and lower limits on welfare or uniform solutions. A short presentation of how to 
incorporate fairness is also done. Finally, section 7 concludes the paper.  
2.  Model 
First, the set-up of an international environmental problem will be presented. 
The set of countries is  I={1,2,,,,N).  Each country emits  ei, which causes 
environmental degradation both domestically and abroad. For simplicity, 
assume a global emission problem. Hence, each country is affected by the total 
emission level  ￿ =
i
i e e . Let the emission level in case of no environmental con-
cern at all be 
o
i e . Hence,  ] , 0 [
o
i i e e ˛  and define  } , , , { 1 N e e E = , the set of emission 
levels. Compared to 
o
i e , a country might undertake certain reduction effort. Let 
i
o
i i e e q - =  be the actual reduction level of country i. Due to the global pollutant 
assumption, it is the total reduction level  ￿ =
i
i q Q is relevant for a country’s 
reduced level of environmental degradation. 
 
There are to equivalent ways of specifying the net-benefit function for a 
country. The one is to focus on reduction levels (as done by Barrett, 1991) or, 
alternatively, to focus on emission levels. Since Barrett model is specified in 
terms of reductions, while the main results of this paper are best expressed in 
terms of emissions level, both approaches are presented and compared below. 
5 
First the approach fucussing on emissions is presented. The net-benefit of emis-
sion is given by: 
 
) ( ) ( ) , ( e D e B e e NB i i i i i - = . 
 
                                                                 
5  For a nice textbook treatment, see e.g. Perman et. al. (1996) and for a more theoretical analysis, 
see Welsch (1993).  
11
) ( i i e B  measures the benefit from emission. Emissions generate utility as an in-
put in the production and consumption of goods. Alternatively, the benefit func-
tions may be interpreted as the opportunity costs of abatement of countries 
(where lower emissions imply higher opportunity costs).  ) (e Di  measures the 
damage from total emission. Standard assumptions of strictly concave NB func-
tions comprising strictly concave benefit and strictly convex damage functions 
are made: 0 ) (   and   0 ) (
' ' ' £ > i i i i e B e B  while  . 0 ) ( D   , 0 ) (
' ' ' ‡ > e e D i i  Let  } , , , { 1 N B B = B and 
} , , , {   1 N C C = W  be the set of strict concave benefit function and strict convex 
environmental cost functions, respectively. 
 
Define an emission game  }   , , , { W B = G ˛ E I g . In this way, an emission game (or an 
IEP) g consists of a profile of players, their NB-functions and the individual 
emission levels. In what follows, the number of players and the feasible emis-
sion levels is fixed at every profile. Hence, the g’s differ with respect to cost 
and benefit functions and define a general class of IEP with  strict concave 
benefit function and strict convex environmental cost functions, respectively. In 
this analysis focus will be exclusively on cost-differences, and it is assumed 
that all countries benefit functions are equal. The analysis is equally valid if 
focussing on differences on the benefit side. 
 
Specifications in terms of reduction levels are also possible. In this version, 
) (Q Bi  measures the benefit to country i from total reduction, Q. The benefit is 
derived from reduced damages from controling emission. On the other hand, 
costs from controlling emission only dependents on own reduction, qi, and is 
measured by  ) ( i i q C . Hence, the net-benefit to country i amounts to: 
 
) ( ) ( ) , ( i i i i i q C Q B Q q NB - = . 
 
Here too, we make the standard assumptions on the functions: 
 
0 ) (   and   0 ) (
' ' ' £ > Q B Q B i i  while  . 0 ) ( C   , 0 ) (




The comparison between the two approaches is best done be identifying that 
they represent the same information. The first identity is: 
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The marginal benefit from increased reduction is equal to the marginal damage 
from increased reduction, at the point where emission levels corresponds to re-
duction levels. 
 
The second is: 
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The marginal cost from increased reduction is equal to the marginal benefit 
from increased emission (the gain from avoiding additional abatemetn by a 
marginal increase in emission). This shows that the two approaches, using 
reduction levels or using emission levels, of course, are equivivalent and their 
relative merit dependent on the circumstances. 
 
If each country behaves non co-operatively, it maximises its respective net-
benefit function with respect to its own emissions, ei, considering only damages 
in its own country but not those abroad, or alternatively, not considering the 
public good character of its own reduction effort on the other countries’ well 
being. 
 
Formally, the d efinition of the non co-operative levels of emissions and 
reductions are: 
 












i q C q q B q = = -  
Where  } , , , , , { 1 1 1 N i i i e e e e e + - - =  and  } , , , , , { 1 1 1 N i i i q q q q q + - - = .  
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Hereafter, define uniform reductions as follows: 
Absolute uniform reductions (Barrett, 1991): 
I j i q q j i ˛ " = ,   , . 
Relative uniform solutions: 
I i e e
nc
i ˛ " ˛ =   ), 1 , 0 (   , i a a . 
 
Where 1-a is the equal percentage reduction for all countries. E.g. a=0.7 re-
quires a 30% reduction in a specified future date compared to observed past 
emissions of any signaturing country. 
 
The first simply states that countries reductions are equalized. This type of uni-
form reduction requires that each country reduce the same in absolute terms. In 
Barrett (1991), this can at first be justified since the countries are of equal size. 
Once the countries differ in any respect, like in Barrett’s model where the costs 
of the two countries differ, it, however, generates strange results as will be clear 
in section 3. The second approach, on the other hand takes actual emissions into 
account. In this way it take into account that e.g. cost differences has moved 
else wise symmetric countries onto different emission-paths. Hence, the main 
difference between the two approaches is on what basis the reduction is com-
pared. In Barrett, the uniform reduction is compared to e
o, while in the second 
approach, uniform reduction is compared to the actual emission level (the non 
co-operative level, 
nc
i e ). As long as these two differs, the two approaches yield 
different result. This will be clear in section 3, where an example is presented. 
 
A very important uniform reduction is the preferred uniform reduction of a 
country which also is denoted the uniform peak of country i. 






i e D e B a a a . 
Due to the assumptions on B and D, there always exists a unique  1 <
P
i a  for all 
countries.
7 It is in the same way possible to define a peak with respect to q. 
                                                                 
6  This is a common observation; see e.g. Hoel (1998).  
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Note that in order for a country to being able to calculate its peak it only need 
knowledge about its own benefit and damage function and the observed 
emission levels of the other countries. 
 
The basic claim of this paper is that the most fundamental requirement that a 
solution must satisfy in order have any change on yielding any progress to an 
IEP is that of  IR.  The relevance of this requirement is e.g. noted by Sandler 
(1997): ‘Successful collective actions require that all participants perceive a net 
benefit. This simple realization is often forgotten'. In all, this paper expressed 
the view that IR is a necessary condition that cannot be questioned, if sovereign 
countries are to engage in a voluntarily agreement. It can only be expected that 
a country enters an agreement that yields as least as much as in the case of no 
coordinated actions at all. In this way,  ) (
nc
i e NB serves as a defintion of what 
acountry at least should expect from enterning an agreement. 
 
Define individual rationality (IR): A vector e satisfies IR if 
I i e NB e NB
nc
i i ˛ " ‡ -   , 0 ) ( ) ( . Alternatively:  I i q NB q NB
nc
i i ˛ " ‡ -   , 0 ) ( ) ( . 
 
In this paper, this ex ante IR specification is used. This can be viewed as in two 
ways: Firstly, if one country leaves the agreement breaks down and we are back 
to the non co-operative situation. Since this is known in advance, there will be 
no agreement if one countries IR is not satisfied. Secondly, it can be viewed as 
a minimum requirement (in case that a country leaves the agreement, this is the 
worst that can happen). 
 
After having established the basic set-up, focus will in the next section be to 
compare the Barrett (1991) specification with the relative uniform reductions 
approach, in order to clarify why the first does not guarantees IR, while the sec-
ond approach does. 
                                                                 
7  For more on this, see Brandt (2001).  
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3.  Comparison of different specifications,  
an example 
First it is instructive to reproduce the specification of Barrett (1991). His origi-




10 [   ) (
2 Q






i i = . 
 









Q a b q C Q B Q q NB
i
i i i i i i - - = - = . 
 
Moreover, in Barrett’s cases, he assumes that N=2 and a1=a2=10. 
 
Table 1: Barrett’s (1991) case with c1=1, c2=2 and b1=b2=1 
  Country 1  Country 2 
  Abatement  Net benefit  DF1




5.74  51.09  0.00  2.87  59.16     0.00 
1 chooses 
q1=q2 
6.67  66.67  15.58  6.67  44.42  -14.74 
2 chooses 
q1=q2 
5.00  62.50  11.41  5.00  50.00   -9.16 
a
) , ( ) , ( 1 2 1 1 2 1 1
nc nc q q NB q q NB DF - = . 
b
) , ( ) , ( 2 2 1 2 2 1 2
nc nc q q NB q q NB DF - = . 
 
The first problem with Barrett’s specification is that it generates strange results. 
From table 1, it can be concluded that the preferred uniform solution for coun-
try 2, the one where both reduce 5, yields a loss to country 2 of 9.16 compared 
to the non co-operative situation. This obviously implies that no uniform solu-
tions satisfy the individually constraint for country 2, which is the point made 
by Barrett. However, what lies behind this result and what does this solution 
imply? While country 2 abates 74.2% more than under the non co-operative so- 
16
lution, country 1 abates 12.9% less than u nder the non co-operative solution.
8 
These figures reveal that this can hardly be called a uniform reduction once 
compared to the situation before the agreement is made, which will be the basis 
to evaluate uniform reductions in this paper. 
 
Another problem with Barrett’s specification is that it only focuses on reduction 
levels, while real-world specifications are, as indicated in the introduction, of-
ten percentage reduction compared to actual emission-levels. Since e
o is not 
specified (or defined), we cannot simply translate reduction obligations into 
emission levels. This, however, does not establish a real problem for the com-
parison. This i s seen by transforming Barrett’s model into a specification in 
terms of emissions, and more specific, in terms of uniform reductions compared 
to the non co-operative situation. Let 
o
i e  be emission level without any envi-
ronmental concern, ei the actual emission level and finally, hence  i
o
i i e e q - = , the 







i e e q - = .  Arbitrarily, we choose  20 2 1 = =
o o e e . Let the reduction 




i i e e q a - = . The resulting 
simulations of this specification is shown in table 2. 
 
                                                                 
8  This solution is, for obvious reasons never acceptable for country 2, and hence, the uniform 
solution presented here is not generating any progress.  
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Table 2: Barrett’s example with the relative uniform approach 
c2  a1
P  q1  q2  NB1  NB2 
nc q1  
nc q2   DF1  DF2 
1  0.89  6.65  6.65  66.67  66.67  5.00  5.00  4.17  4.17 
2  0.86  7.71  5.27  57.95  59.92  5.71  2.86  6.86  0.76 
3  0.84  8.24  4.88  54.22  52.44  6.00  2.00  8.22  -5.56 
5  0.84  8.45  4.25  50.98  41.52  6.25  1.25  9.57  -15.51 
c2  a2
P  q1  q2  NB1  NB2 
nc q1  
nc q2   DF1  DF2 
1  0.89  6.65  6.65  66.67  66.67  5.00  5.00  4.17  4.17 
2  0.92  6.85  4.24  56.69  62.19  5.71  2.86  5.60  3.03 
3  0.94  6.84  3.08  51.21  60.37  6.00  2.00  5.21  2.37 
5  0.96  6.80  2.00  45.52  58.64  6.25  1.25  4.11  1.61 
 
Again let N=2 and a1=a2=10, with c1=1, b1=b2=1 and c2 varying from 1 to 5. 
 
Comparing the two tables, the most striking difference is that IR in table 2 now 
is satisfied for any preferred choice of country 2. Hence, uniform solutions now 
exists that satisfied IR. 
 
The reason for this is that reductions now are compared to the non co-operative 
actions coupled with the fact that there always exist gains for some reductions 
above the non co-operative level. Compared to Barrett (1991), individual ra-
tionality is satisfied. Of special interests is that, as seen in table 2, only the peak 
of the highest cost type can guarantee IR: In case of high cost-difference the 
peak of country 1 leads to a loss for country 2.
9 Hence, although a uniform solu-
tion exists that satisfy IR, since they only can guarantee IR, when the peak of 
the highest cost-country is used, it might not bring around much reduction.
10 
The last result hinges on the fact that 
p
i a approaches 1, as the cost parameter, ci 
increases sufficiently. 
                                                                 
9  This is a general result, see Brandt (2001). 
10  Or more correct, uniform reduction around the peak of the highest cost country.  
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4.  Reaction functions 
Table 2 reveals that the alternative specification used in this paper yields IR for 
the specific problem analysed by Barrett. It is now time to generalize this result 
and to show that it is valid for all emission games with concave NB-functions. 
The most convenient to proceed is to use a reaction function specification. Let 
the countries maximize  ) ( ) ( ) , ( e D e B e e NB i i i i i - = . Define the best reply function, or 
the reaction function of country i, as the function that relates the optimal choice 
of country i to the choice of the other countries,  ) ( i i i e e R - = . The slope of the re-
action function is found by inserting the reaction function into the first order 
condition  ) ), ( ( )) ( (
' '
i i i i i i i e e e D e e B - - - = . Differentiating this expression with respect to 
e-i, and rearranging yields: 



















Since  0 and   0
' ' £ ‡
''
i i  B D ,  we have that  0 1 £ £ -
'
i R .  Given the assumptions on the 
cost and damage function, a unique interior solution always exists.
11  Define 
} ,..., { 1
nc
N
nc nc e e e =  as the non-cooperative (and unique) equilibrium level of emis-
sions, given by the intersection of the reaction functions. 
 
Define  } ) , ( | ) , {( k e e NB e e I i i i i i i = = - - as the set of iso-net-benefit lines for country i, 
i.e. Ii is the set of emission levels that yields constant net benefit for country i in 
the  plane ) , ( - -i i e e . Given the assumption on  C and B, the Ii’s are concave and 
continuous and their ‘maximum’ defines the reaction function. 
 
Lower Ii implies higher NBi, since it implies points of unchanged emission for 
country i, but lower  
 
                                                                 
11  For more on conditions for uniqueness and interior solutions, see Hoel (1991). A thorough dis-
cussion of the shape of benefit and damage curves can be found in most books on environ-
mental economics, for a sound discussion, se e.g. Perman et. al (1999). Justifications for Nash-
equilibrium under no agreement see e.g. Hoel (1991).  
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emission for its opponents.  All this is summerized in figure 1. Most 
importantly, there always exists, under the assumptions made on B and C, a set 
a points that yields a Pareto-improvement over 
nc e , situated to the ‘South West’ 
of 
nc e , in between the iso net-benefit functions through 
nc e
12.  In figure 1, the 
shaded area in figure 1 represents Pareto-improvements compared to 
nc e . The 
most important observation in this section is stated in the lemma below: 
 
Lemma 1 : The straight line from e
nc to the origin always enters the set of 
Pareto-improvements over 
nc e  for all  G ˛ g . 
 
The proof is straightforward: Recall that at 









e NB  implying that 
marginal changes in e i does not alter the net benefit received for country i. On 









e NB , since  . 0 ) (
' > e Di  Hence, for sufficient small (includ-
ing equal) reductions in emissions, the net benefit is increased for country i. 
 
Given the assumptions on B and D, there always exists a Pareto improvement 
set as specified in figure 1. The trick here is that at e
nc, the iso net benefit lines 
of country 1 and 2 are horisontal and vertical, respectively, while line from the 
                                                                 
12  This result follow from standard reaction function analysis like presented in Hoel (1991) or e.g. 
Tirole (1988).  
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origin to 
nc e  is positive sloping. This line always enters this set. An example of 
this is presented in figure 1. 
 
Now it is possible to state the main results concerning the type of uniform solu-
tions that are specified relative to 
nc e . 
 
Proposition 1: When uniform reductions are specified as 
nc
i e e a = i , then  for all 








i i e D e B e D e B a a  




i e e a = i . Increasing  a from 0 to 1, yields a straight line from the 
origin to 
nc e . By use of lemma 1, the proof is established.  
 
For any  IEP with strict concave NB, and with emissions target specified as 
nc
i e e a = i , there always exists a uniform solution that satisfies the individual 
rationlity constraint without the use of side payments.  
 
Note that the 45
o-line in figure 1 is the set of uniform solutions for the ‘Barrett’ 
specification, when 
o o e e 2 1 = . In this case, no uniform solution enters the Pareto-
improvement set. Given his specification, uniform solutions only accidently 
satisfy the  IR-constraint. On the other hand, given the uniform reductions are 
specified relative to the non co-operative solution, there always exists a whole 
set of Pareto-improving uniform solutions.  
 
Table 2 and figure 1 both indicate that certain uniform solutions satisfy IR, 
while others do not. Moreover, it should be clear that the higher the reduction 
levels, the smaller, ceteris paribus, the possibility that this reduction level satis-
fies IR. In order for a better description of this connection, we will now analyse 
how the set of uniform solution that satisfy IR depends on changes in the cost-
structure of a country.  
21
5.  Comparative static results 
Table 2 indicates that the higher the costs of country 2, the higher its peak, im-
plying that it prefers smaller reduction obligations. This result can be general-
ized using comparative static analysis, which will be will be done by focussing 
on graphical and intuitive reasoning. In order to focus on changes in costs, de-
fine a shift parameter, bi that shifts the Bi function. 
 
Definition: Let  ) , ( i i i i e B B b =  with bi a shift parameter. Let higher bi mean higher 
abatement costs:  ) , ( ) , (
' '
i i i i i i i i e B e B b b b b > ￿ > for all ei. 
 
The idea is that higher  bi imply an upward shift in the abatement cost curve. 
Since the benefit from emission is the o pportunity cost of abatement, higher 
costs implies higher benefits from emissions. 
 
Result 1 : The set of individual rational uniform solutions is non-increasing 
with increasing bi. 
 
To see this, note that the higher  costs, the more concave the iso net-benefit 
curves. Recall that the Ii-curves measure the level of compensation necessary in 
form of changes in ei when e-i changes in order for country i to be equally well 
of (a decrease in e1 needs some decrease in e2 to make country 1 equally well 
of). As the costs of a country increase more compensation it needed, which 
amounts to say that the higher the costs, the more concave the iso net-benefit 
curves. This is also shown in figure 2, where the new ‘more concave’ curve be-
ing is denoted 
'
2 I . Hence, the area that country 2 prefers shrinks for increasing 
c2. Since the Pareto-improvement set is situated between the iso net-benefit 
functions, the result follows immediate. Notice that for sufficient high c osts, 
there is almost no possibility for further improvements.  
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a implying that  ¥ ﬁ ﬁ i
p
i b a for    1 . 
 
Due to the assumed curvature of  B and D, an upward shift in  Bi will always 
imply a higher peak for that country and for obvious reasons: While the damage 
side is unchanged, the benefits from indidual emissions in increased and the 
result follows. This also gives an explanation of point 1 above. From a point, 
where costs are equal, increasing costs of one, e.g. country 2, the Pareto-
improvement area is a smaller and smaller subset of the original set. 
 













Since the peak of the other countries is not influenced by the cost structure of 
other countries, this result follows from result 2. 
 
Result 3 implies that the difference between the peaks increases, as the cost dif-
ferences increase. This is another way of showing that the relative merit of the 
uniform solutions reduces when the cost differences are high (of equivalently,  
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the benefit differences are high).
13 Combining these points reveals that with in-
creasing cost-differences, the disagreement over what uniform solution to use 
increases as well. This amounts to say (which is a well-known observation, 
normally based on the lack of cost-efficiency) that uniform solutions are most 
easy to implement, when costs are equal. 
6.  Upper and lower bound on welfare 
Proposition 1 state that for all g, it is possible to find a uniform solution that sat-
isfies  IR. Note that it does not say that any uniform solutions necessarily do. 
Hence, we are left with the problem of specifying what uniform to choose. In 
this section, we will present two types of uniform solution, that deserve as an 
upper and a lower bound on welfare given focus is on uniform solutions. The 
upper bound is the uniform solution that maximizes the collective net benefit 
under the IR-constraint. The lower bound is that (unique) uniform solution that, 
no matter g, always secures IR. In this way, the upper bound is reachable when 
the exact  g is known in advance, while the lower bound is important in cases 
when the emission game could be any, hence, in cases of e.g. total ex ante pri-
vate information about the B’s. 
6.1  The optimal uniform solution, upper bound on welfare 
The upper bound on welfare under the uniformity assumption can be deter-
mined by considering the optimal uniform solution, i.e. that uniform solution 
that maximises overall welfare under the  IR-constraint. Now define 






i i i e D e B NB ￿ - = a a a as the net benefit to country i when all countries are 
subject to the same relative reduction of 
nc
j j e e a = . 
                                                                 
13  However, the same could be said about differentiated solutions. See section 7.  
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To find the optimal uniform solution, we have to solve the following maximisa-
tion program: 
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Before formulating the Kuhn-Tucker conditions for this problem, recall that 
1   0 < £a . 




NB NB a l a l , where li are the lan-
grage multipliers on the IR-constraint. The Kuhn-Tucker conditions reads: 
 
I i   , 0
I i   , 0 )) ( (
0 ) (




























Two cases can be identified, one where the IR are all non-binding and one 
where non-binds.  
 
Case 1: " " l l=0 
Then [a] becomes 
















First, obviously, the solution must lie between the highest and the lowest peak, 
since all NB-functions are strict concave. As a is increased from the lowest 
peak, all countries with higher peaks will increase their NB and all countries 
with lower peaks will decrease their NB. At some point, the increase and de- 
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i NB . This 
means that reducing a would yield an increase in total NB, but this option is not 
feasible since for at least one country NB binds, restricting the overall welfare. 
Comparing with the discussion in section 4, this is most likely to exist when 




Figure 3: The optimal uniform solution 
Combining the above with proposi-
tion 1, a very i nteresting result 
emerges: 
 
Proposition 2: There always exists 
an optimal uniform solution that 
satisfied IR without the use of  
side payments. 
 
Due to proposition 1, we know that 
there always exists a solution to the 
optimal uniform solution. The o p-
timal uniform solution is at the point in the plan where the two indifference-
                                                                 
14  In the last case, welfare could presumably be increased considerably by not including the high 
cost country. 
    
OUS  e  1    
e  1    
e  2    
OUS  e  2     
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curves are tangent to the uniform line. We can identify two cases, one where 
individual rationality constraint binds, and one where it does not. In the first 
case, the OUS lies on the 'contract curve', i.e. the tangency point of the 45
o-line 
and the two indifference curves, as shown in figure 3, indicated by the point 
(
OUS e1 ,
OUS e2 ). If the  IR-constraint binds, then points on the 'contract curve' are 
unlikely obtainable without side payments, but it still yields a Pareto improve-
ment compared to  e
nc.
15 Here, the optimal uniform solution I identified as the 
point where the uniform line cuts the iso-welfare line of the country with the 
binding IR-constraint Note that these arguments are equally valid for a n coun-
try solution. This result is again in contrast to Barrett (1991), where constrained 
optimal solutions might not exists without the use of side payments. 
6.2  The least common denominator, the lower bound on  
welfare 
The least common denominator (LCD) solution simply picks the highest peak, 
i.e. the peak implying the lowest overall reduction. 
 
Formally: let  ] , , , , max[ 2 1
P
n
P P LCD a a a a = . 
The solution that always picks 
LCD a is called the least common denominator 
solution. 
 
This solution always satisfies  IR
16: Take e.g. the solution where the second 
largest peak 
P




n n NB NB a a , while 




n i e NB NB a , for all i. comparing these two equations it is evident that 
the only peak that always guarantees IR is the highest peak. 
 
It is shown in Brandt (2001) that the least common denominator solution is the 
only solution that under private information about reduction costs satisfies the 
IR constraint for any combination of costs and benefits. This then implies that 
using this solution, we are certain that the IR also ex-post is satisfied, and in 
                                                                 
15  By reducing a slightly, both countries can be made strictly better of. 
16  By always, it is meant for any strict convex cost function.  
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this way, no country will leave the agreement on basis of a violation of the IR-
constraint. 
6.3  When lower and when upper bound? 
If, along the way if implementing the obligation, a country realizes that it re-
ceives a net-loss, it will presumably leave the agreement, which makes the 
agreement unstable. If we stick to the hypothesis that only a solution that ex-
ante can guarantee IR has the potential of being a candidate for a stable solu-
tion, this can serve as a way to select between different uniform solutions. 
 
The optimal uniform solution represents the upper bound on welfare, when re-
stricted to uniform solutions that without the use of side-payments guarantees 
IR. If there is full information ex-ante, this solution is feasible in the sense that 
it needs full information to secure that IR is satisfied ex post. That is, if all the 
C and B are perfectly known in advance, it will also ex post guarantee IR. This 
might be especially severe when  IR is binding, i.e., when cost differences are 
large. Due to result 2 and 3 in section 5, we can conclude that it is more likely 
that the IR binds, when cost-differences are high. Due to result 1, the lower the 
cost difference, the higher reductions are possible. 
 
The  LCD–solution on the other hand guarantees that no matter the knowledge, 
if each country simply announces its preferred peak, this solution always guar-
antees  IR. (see Brandt 2001). Hence, it seems most appropriate under private 
information o f reduction costs. Due to result 2, we know that when cost-
differences are high (or costs in general are high), then it does not yield much 
overall reduction. 
6.4  Fairness and uniformity 
Each countries peak deserves as a natural focal point for a country when enter-
ing a negotiation. We saw in the preceding section that when cost-differences 
exists, the peaks will turn out different, which obviously complicates negotia-
tions and creates the need for a rule that chooses a uniform reduction on basis  
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of certain fairness measures. In our model, a fairness measure should for obvi-
ous reasons propose a uniform reduction in between the highest and lowest 
peak. Furthermore, it must always guarantee IR. As an example of such a rule, 
here only specified for a two-country situation, is the following fairness rule: 
 
Choose  ) , ( 2 1
p p a a a˛ such that: 
) ( ) (
) ( ) (
) ( ) (























This rule is based on the idea that it equalizes what each country could have got 
at best relative to what it actually gets. This fairness rule has three important 
properties: 
 
1.  If countries are equal, it treats them equally. 
2.  It always is individual rational. 
3.  The resulting uniform reductions are always between the lowest and the 
highest peak. 
 
While the two first points are rather obvious, the third needs some words of ex-
planation. At the highest peak, this country gets all it can possibly get, while the 
other gets less. By reducing  a slightly, the high-cost country get relative less, 
the low cost country gets relative more until somewhere in-between the peaks 
described by the above expression. Total welfare is also increased compared to 
taking the highest peak. Simply because a reduction in a from this peak, the in-
crease in NB for the low cost country is higher than the decrease in NB for high-
cost  country (due to the concavity of the net-benefit functions). Hence it estab-
lishes a welfare increase compared to the LCD-solution. 
 
In this way it is possible to both tailor the uniform solutions against optimality 
and fairness criterions, under the restrictions that the requirement of uniform 
reductions puts on the solutions. The severity of this constraint depends on 
which type of  IEP has to be addressed and in the end determines the relative 
attractiveness of uniform solutions.  
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7.  Perspectives, policy-implications and  
discussions 
This paper corrects one of the misunderstandings about uniform reductions ob-
ligations that have given these types of solutions a bad reputation and the pur-
pose of this analysis has been to shed new light on a set of solutions, that have 
been political feasible but there merits doubted by economists. Once established 
that uniform solutions always exist satisfying the individual rationality con-
straint, it is more easy to comprehend why the use of uniform solutions have 
been the default solution in many IEP, especially in the initial phase of building 
up a reduction regime, where the privacy of information is high. In such cases, 
uniform solutions, and especially the LCD-solution, might constitute a unique 
feasible alternative. Grubb (1996) notes that: “In the case of global warming, 
raising the question of differentiation among countries potentially opens a Pan-
dora’s box of special leading. The economic systems that emit greenhouse gas-
ses (GHG) are extremely complex. If differentiation is taken to mean trying to 
negotiate different numerical targets for each individual country according to 
these circumstances, the scope for never-ending distributional arguments could 
sink the negotiations (p.47)”. The essence of Grubb’s message is that when 
countries are much dislike, agreeing on differentiated solutions is a compli-
cated, or even dangerous task, especially as long as information is limited. The 
robustness of uniform solutions here outweighs the efficiency loss.
17 
 
Compared to e.g. Hoel (1992) and Barrett (1991), this paper shows that uniform 
solutions indeed have certain desirable properties, and looking at it more 
broadly, the choice between uniform and differentiated solutions seems no 
longer as obvious, but rather context dependent. In the end, the choice amongst 
them depends on  numerous factors like the present state of the  information-
structure, the set of  political restrictions and factors related to the negotiation 
process. The political restrictions are (to some extent) defined by the character-
istics of the IEP. For example, certain characteristics point to the use of uniform 
reductions, especially when the simplicity of these solutions is essential. This 
                                                                 
17  It has been noted that uniform solutions are especially important in early stages of the negotia-
tions process, because they are not easily manipulable (see e.g. Brandt 2001).  
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might be the case when many countries from different parts of the world are 
involved, or when damages are so high that cost considerations are less impor-
tant. 
 
The Kyoto agreement has been denoted a successful route. Obviously, the re-
sent breakdown in the climate change negotiations at The Hague indicates the 
contrary: However, the original Kyoto-agreement stipulated differentiated re-
duction obligations amounts the different OECD. Moreover, the differentiation 
is even more severe when taking into account the different business-as-usual 
growth rates amount the countries.
18 So once again, a small-scale uniform re-
duction might have been preferable.
19 
 
Although one cannot simply compare different IEP, there is a clear tendency to 
move from uniform to differentiated reduction regimes can be observed for 
many problems. Greene (1996) notes that experiences from the agreements to 
combat acid rain may provide some of the most relevant lessons on ways of de-
veloping differentiated commitments over time. It indicates that it should be 
more possible to agree on complex differentiated commitments as  the first 
agreement(s) become well established and hence, detailed common understand-
ings have developed of the problem and the responses, and simple, equal com-
mitments have been both agreed and begun to be effectively implemented
20. In 
this way, an agreement that only requires status-quo (or very small reductions), 
but point to the need for further research and so on, might in cases with high 
uncertainties be that approach with the highest chances for success in the long 
run. This amounts to say that by including uniform solutions in the set of feasi-
ble alternatives, the long run objectives might be easier to reach, not the con-
trary. 
                                                                 
18  For more on this, see Brandt and Svendsen (2001). 
19  The US is now going for a renegotiation of the whole Protocol. 
20  An obvious movement is to go from totally uniform to group uniform solution as analysed in 
Brandt (2001).  
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